

2026年度

愛知淑徳大学 大学院  
博士後期課程（4月入学）入学試験

## 英語試験問題

（ビジネス研究科）

マネジメント&エコノミー専修

<一般入試>

2026年2月18日（水）実施

10:45～11:45

### 注意事項

- 1 試験開始の合図があるまで、この問題用紙を開いてはいけない。
- 2 解答用紙には、受験番号および氏名を正しく記入すること。
- 3 試験中に問題文の誤字、脱字等に気づいた場合は、手をあげて試験監督者に知らせること。
- 4 問題用紙は試験終了後、持ち帰ること。

次のAまたはBの英文のうち、いずれかを選択して和訳しなさい。

A

Chinese automaker BYD is poised to overtake U.S. rival Tesla in global electric vehicle sales on a calendar-year basis for the first time, positioning the company as the world's top EV seller.

BYD's EV sales for 2025 rose 28% to 2.25 million units, the company said on Thursday. Tesla has not yet disclosed full-year EV sales, but on Monday it released a market estimate indicating a decline of 8% to 1.64 million units.

In 2024, Tesla narrowly held the top spot in global sales, beating BYD by just over 20,000 units. The Chinese automaker appears to have overtaken its U.S. competitor by a substantial margin.

BYD tapped into its massive domestic market while also pursuing growing sales overseas. The company's 2025 EV sales were 150% higher than in 2022. As the global leader, the Chinese automaker could leverage economies of scale for parts procurement, further strengthening its price competitiveness.

BYD's total new-vehicle sales in 2025 rose 8% to 4.6 million units, its fifth consecutive year of growth. The company surpassed Japan's Honda Motor and Nissan Motor in annual sales in 2024. Among passenger cars, which account for more than 90% of the automaker's sales, EVs numbered 2.25 million units, while plug-in hybrid sales fell 8% to 2.28 million units.

Overseas sales grew significantly, driven by a strong performance in Europe and the company's expansion into Latin America and Southeast Asia. BYD also brought its Brazil plant online in 2025 as a part of a focus on local production. At its Thailand facility, BYD plans to supply EVs to the local market and export them to Europe as well.

In China, the company boosted consumer demand in February by adding advanced driver-assistance features to more than 20 models without raising prices.

But despite its sustained growth, BYD faces challenges. Monthly data shows that in September, sales dropped year-on-year for the first time in 19 months. December sales fell 18% on the year to 420,000 units, the fourth straight month of declining deliveries.

Competition is intensifying in China with rivals such as Geely and new entrants including Xiaomi, which could weigh on BYD's sales.

【出典】SHIZUKA TANABE, "China's BYD set to surpass Tesla and become top global EV seller in 2025: 28% jump in annual deliveries driven by massive domestic market, overseas expansions", *Nikkei Asia*, January 1, 2026

<https://asia.nikkei.com/business/automobiles/electric-vehicles/china-s-byd-set-to-surpass-tesla-and-become-top-global-ev-seller-in-2025> より抜粋

## B

Tokyo's recent comments that a Taiwan contingency would pose an existential threat to Japan's security have drawn strong rebukes from Beijing, which has warned of "severe damage" to economic ties and hinted at economic pressure. Japan sends about a quarter of its goods exports to China and Hong Kong. In a region that anchors the global semiconductor industry, we immediately feel the diplomatic chill. The risk is not only escalation at sea. It is that the language used to manage these tensions weaponizes supply chains.

Over the past few years, terms like "friend-shoring," "de-risking" and "decoupling" have moved from political talk to everyday policy and corporate strategy conversations. They sound technical and prudent. However, they shape what leaders see as possible. If we frame every China-Japan dispute over Taiwan through this vocabulary, we will also gradually redesign supply chains around political alignment rather than capability and necessity. That may feel safer in the short run. Over time, it risks leaving all sides with more expensive, less flexible and more fragile networks.

East Asia sits at the core of this story. Taiwan produces most of the world's leading-edge chips. Japan is essential in semiconductor equipment, materials and precision components. China is a dominant electronics market and a growing producer. War-game scenarios around a blockade or conflict in the Taiwan Strait show that even a temporary disruption could trigger a renewed global chip crisis, hitting Japanese carmakers and electronics groups. Hence, Japan's tightening of export controls in sensitive technologies and its efforts to diversify away from China are understandable. The question is how far the accompanying language should go.

Friend-shoring emerged in Washington to reduce exposure to coercive partners by rebuilding critical supply chains among "trusted" economies, a concept popularized in U.S. Treasury speeches. This invites organizations to treat "friend" and "non-friend" as the filters for network design, shrinking the pool of partners and accelerating bloc formation rather than genuine diversification. Some countries are neither core allies nor clear rivals, including many in the ASEAN region. These nations do not know whether the world will invite them to the next wave of high-tech value chains or leave them on the sidelines.

【出典】 Wolfgang Lehmacher, Opinion "Right-shoring: Japan can redesign the supply chain to fit its interests", *Nikkei Asia*, January 7, 2026, <https://asia.nikkei.com/opinion/right-shoring-japan-can-redesign-the-supply-chain-to-fit-its-interests>

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